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Abstract 
 
Standard Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach is used to evaluate the efficiency of 
DMUs and treats its internal structures as a “black box”. The aim of this paper is twofold. The 
first task is to survey and classify supply chain DEA models which investigate these internal 
structures. The second aim is to point out the significance of these models for the decision 
maker of a supply chain. We analyze the simple case of these models which is the two-stage 
models and a few more general models such as network DEA models. Furthermore, we study 
some variations of these models such as models with only intermediate measures between 
first and second stage and models with exogenous inputs in the second stage. We define four 
categories: typical, relational, network and game theoretic DEA models. We present each 
category along with its mathematical formulations, main applications and possible 
connections with other categories. Finally, we present some concluding remarks and 
opportunities for future research. 
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1. Introduction  
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is an approach based on linear programming and is 
used to assess the relative efficiency among a set of decision making units (DMUs). 
Specifically, DEA measures the efficiency of the i-th DMU under evaluation relative with the 
other DMUs of the set. DMUs use multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs, which can be 
measured in different units. The multiple advantages of DEA make it the appropriate tool for 
the evaluation of supply chain efficiency (Ross and Droge, 2004). DEA aims to generate the 
maximum outputs or use the minimum inputs. This is another attractive aspect from the 
managerial point of view because as Verma and Sinha (2002) point out, a successful firm is 
the one with the ability to produce more while using the least possible resources. 
DEA makes no assumption about the procedures taking place inside the DMU. On the 
contrary, DEA treats a DMU as a “black box” which uses inputs to produce outputs without 
considering the internal procedures, a usually sufficient assumption (Sexton and Lewis, 
2003). However in some cases, like in supply chain systems, DEA models consist of two or 
more stages and there are intermediate measures which are considered as inputs in one stage 
and outputs in another stage. In multistage models we can see each stage as a decision center 
and the overall process is managed by the corporate manager who is the overall decision 
maker. Internally, the decision center aims to succeed the best possible allocation of the 
resources according to its preferences and needs while externally aims for a bigger market 
share (Ross and Droge, 2002). 
According to Ross and Droge (2004), the evaluation of the efficiencies of the supply 
chain and its individual stages is of extreme importance for the decision maker-corporate 
manager. An accurate assessment of the efficiency allows the manager to better understand 
the overall process and the subprocesses and make a better judgment about his decisions. 
The aim of this paper is to survey the models which consider the internal structures 
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inside a DMU, especially two-stage models and a few more general cases and highlight their 
importance for the decision maker. We can classify these models into four categories. First, 
models which apply typical DEA methodology separately to each stage, without considering 
the interaction between the two stages. Second, models which consider the relation between 
two or more stages. Third, network DEA in which the second stage uses exogenous inputs 
apart from the intermediate inputs and may consist of more than two stages. In the last 
category, two-stage models are analyzed based on game theory approaches. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the models which 
apply the standard DEA approach in each stage. In section 3 we demonstrate the relational 
models and in section 4 we examine network DEA models. In section 5 the game theoretic 
models are presented. Along these sections there is a continuous discussion about the 
connections between the different models. The last section concludes the number with a 
number of interesting remarks and proposes the lines for future research. 
2. Evaluation of the two-stage efficiency by applying typical DEA methodology 
This type of two-stage model apply standard DEA methodology separately in first and 
second stage without considering possible conflicts between the two stages. Such conflicts 
may arise because of the intermediate measures, which this type of model does not treat in a 
simultaneous manner. Suppose a supply chain where the first stage is a manufacturer and the 
second stage is a retailer. Now, suppose that the retailer achieves maximum efficiency in 
contrast with the manufacturer. It is reasonable that the manufacturer would increase his 
outputs in order to achieve maximum efficiency. However, an increase in the manufacturer's 
outputs means an increase in the retailers inputs, because the first stage outputs are the second 
stage inputs, and as a result a decrease in the retailer's efficiency. These conflicts cannot be 
addressed by these models. 
The first who studied these models were Seifrod and Zhu (1999). They apply this 
   
 
 
4 
approach to evaluate the efficiency of the top commercial banks in USA. The majority of the 
existing studies in the banking sector use a number of variables which are sufficient in order 
to evaluate bank’s operational performance, but they cannot capture market performance. 
Seifrod and Zhu (1999) evaluate the market performance by including a number of market 
variables in their model. They adopt a two-stage model, one stage for the operational 
performance and one stage for the market performance.  
This two-stage procedure is presented in Figure 1. In the first stage, the banks 
consume inputs and produce profits while in the second stage the banks use profits to create 
market value. Seiford and Zhu (1999) apply an output oriented constant returns to scale 
(CRS) DEA model (Charnes et al., 1978) in order to measure the efficiency of the two stages 
as follows: 






 
s
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r
m
=i
i
t s+sε+θmax
1
+
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0+- rij s,s,λ   
where 10θ  and 
2
0θ  are the CRS efficiencies from the first and second stage respectively, ijx  is 
the i-th input of the j-th DMU, rjy  is the r-th output of the j-th DMU and 
-
is  and 
+
rs  are the 
slack variables. If 110 =θ  and all slack variables are zero, then the j-th DMU is efficient in the 
first stage. If 120 =θ  and all slack variables are zero, then the j-th DMU is efficient in the 
second stage. 
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Figure 1: A two-stage procedure (Seiford and Zhu, 1999). 
 
 
Zhu (2000) applies the same methodology in order to evaluate the efficiency of 500 
firms of Fortune Global. Sexton and Lewis (2003) study a similar model to measure the 
efficiency of the teams of Major League Baseball. In the first stage, teams use money and 
produce talent as an intermediate measure. In stage two, teams convert the talent into victories 
which is the final output. Thus, in the first stage the authors assess the ability of the team to 
utilize the money efficiently to acquire talented players while in the second stage they 
evaluate the ability to exploit the talent and convert it into victories in the field. 
Sexton and Lewis (2003) use an input oriented model for each of the stages. For a 
specific 0DMU , ix  m,=i 1,  are the inputs in the first stage, dz  D,=d 1,  are the 
intermediate measures and ry  s,=r 1,  are the final outputs in the second stage. As we can 
see in figure 2, in the first stage if we increase inputs ix  then intermediate measures dz  
would increase as well. However, when we treat dz  as inputs in the second stage then outputs 
ry  would suffer a decrease.  
Figure 2: An output oriented two-stage DEA model (Sexton and Lewis, 2003). 
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In addition, Sexton and Lewis (2003) introduce reverse variables context in two-stage 
DEA models. Commonly, a grater amount of an input means more consumption of this input 
and a greater amount of an output means more production of this output. In reverse variables 
context exactly the opposite occurs. Thus, a greater amount of a reverse input means less use 
of this input while a greater amount of a reverse output means less production of this output. 
The authors use “total bases lost” as a reverse intermediate measure. 
Chilingerian and Sherman (2004) apply this type of model at hospitals. In the first 
stage, the decisions are made by the administration of the hospital while in the second stage 
the decisions are made by the doctors. Among others, the first stage inputs are the number of 
staff, the medical suppliers and the expenses, while intermediate measures are the quantity 
and the quality of the treatment and final outputs are the number of patients who were treated 
successfully, income form research activities and publications. 
Narasimah et al. (2004) introduce a two stage model to study the “flexibility 
competence” in the first stage which is the ability of the firm to transform resources into 
manufacturing advances and the “execution competence” in the second stage which is the 
ability of the firm to transform the “flexibility competence” into a competitive advantage 
against its competitors. 
3. Relational DEA models 
As we already noted, the main drawback of the previous models is that they assess the 
efficiencies of the two stages independently. Thus, they do not treat intermediate measures dz  
in a coordinated manner (Cook et al., 2010). For example, if a DMU under assessment 
decides to increase first stage outputs in order to become efficient, then second stage inputs 
will be increased as well and as a result second stage will become less efficient. Again if we 
consider the first stage as the manufacturer and the second stage as the retailer, O’Leary-Kelly 
and Flores (2002) note that the decision of the one component of this simple supply chain has 
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a direct impact on the other. Consequently, it is important to incorporate this impact in the 
model. 
 Furthermore, the previous models may consider a DMU as efficient but the individual 
stages as inefficient. Chen and Zhu (2004) develop a model which ensures that the overall 
efficiency of a DMU requires all the individual stages to be efficient. Alternative models that 
address these drawbacks are the multiplicative model of Kao and Hwang (2008) and the 
additive model of Chen et al. (2009a), which are applied at general insurance companies in 
Taiwan. 
According to Chen and Zhu (2004) the standard CRS DEA model (1) and the typical 
VRS DEA model are unable to assess the efficiency of a two stage procedure because of the 
intermediate measures. The authors propose the following VRS model in order to address this 
problem: 
βξαξnim
z,μ, jjλβ,α,
 21~           (2) 
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i0ij
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, s,,=r 1,2 ,        
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1
1
=μ
n
j=
j , 0jμ , n,,=j 1,2   
where 1ξ  and 2ξ  are the weights of the two stages and are defined in an exogenous manner 
by the decision maker based on the preferences over the two stages and the symbol “~” stands 
for the unknown decision variables. The authors point out that the inclusion of additional 
constraints is possible because their model treats intermediate measures as unknown decision 
variables. Chen and Zhu (2004) apply model (2) at the banking sector and measure the 
indirect impact of information technology on the efficiency of a firm, based on Wang et al. 
(1997) data set. 
 According to Zhu (2003) the general case of model (2) can be used to determine the 
efficiency of a supply chain. A supply chain is the most appropriate case study for this type of 
models because every single member of the supply chain applies its own strategy in order to 
become efficient. From a general point of view, the efficiency of a single member does not 
ensure the efficiency of another member. In fact, it is reasonable that most of the times the 
inefficiency of a member is caused by someone else’s efficiency. The author presents an 
example of a supplier and a manufacturer. The supplier increases the price of the raw 
materials in order to increase his income and become more efficient. From the manufacturer's 
point of view, the increase in raw materials price means an increase in his overall costs and as 
a result a decrease in his efficiency, with all others constant. 
Figure 3 presents a typical supply chain (Zhu, 2003) where there are four members, 
namely supplier, manufacturer, distributor and retailer. Moreover, Zhu (2003) marks the 
significance to assess the efficiency of the supply chain and its individual members. This 
analysis assists the decision maker to better comprehend the procedures inside the supply 
chain and to identify the best practices in order to monitor, manage and improve the 
performance of the supply chain. 
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Figure 3: A typical supply chain (Zhu, 2003). 
 
 
Zhu (2003) proposes the following model to evaluate the efficiency of j supply chains, 
which is the general form of Chen and Zhu's (2004) model (2). iξ  are the weights of each 
member of the supply chain and are defined in an exogenous manner by the decision maker 
based on the preferences over the individual stages. 
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where DI and DR are the direct inputs and direct outputs respectively, the symbol “~” stands 
for the unknown decision variables, where the first letter represents its production and the 
second letter represents its consumption. For example, MSz   represents the intermediate 
measure which produced by supplier and consumed by manufacturer. Thus, “s” represents the 
supplier, “m” represents the manufacturer, “d” represents the distributor and “r” represents the 
retailer. As noted in model (2), the inclusion of additional constraints is possible because the 
intermediate measures are treated as unknown decision variables. Zhu (2003) points out that if 
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1* =Ε , then there is an optimal solution that ensures 1*0
*
0
*
0
*
0 =γ=δ=β=λ , where symbol “*” 
represents an optimal value in model (3). Furthermore, if 1* =Ε  then the supply chain is rated 
as efficient and *iΕ  is the optimal efficiency for 1,2,3,4=i  members of the supply chain. 
Next, we present the multiplicative model of Kao and Hwang (2008). Model (1) 
calculates the optimal solution in the dual CRS DEA problem and apparently it is in linear 
form. The efficiency 0E  of the primal problem of model (1) in fractional form is calculated 
below. 


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The efficiencies 10E  and 
2
0E  for stages 1 and 2 respectively, are calculated in the same 
manner. 
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According to Kao and Hwang (2008) from models (4), (5) and (6) the overall and 
individual efficiencies, 0E , 
1
0E  and 
2
0E , for the DMU under assessment are calculated as 
follows: 
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where *ru , 
*
iv  and 
*
pw  are the optimal weights. Thus, the overall efficiency is the product of 
the two individual efficiencies: 20
1
00 EE=E  . In order to incorporate the interaction between 
the two stages, Kao and Hwang (2008) include constraints (7) in model (4). Also, they 
consider the weights of intermediate measures as the same regardless if intermediate measures 
are considered as outputs in stage 1 or as inputs in stage 2. This assumption links the two 
stages and allows the authors to convert the fractional program into a linear one (Chen et al., 
2009a). That is  

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Kao and Hwang (2008) transform fractional program (8) into the linear program (9) as 
follows: 
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Optimal weights in model (9) may not be unique and as a result the decomposition of the 
overall efficiency 0E into the efficiencies of each stage, 
1
0E  and 
2
0E  respectively, may not be 
unique either. Kao and Hwang (2008) propose the maximization of one of the individual 
efficiencies, say 10E , while maintaining the overall efficiency at 0E  as calculated in model 
(9). The other individual efficiency 20E  is calculated as 1
0
02
0
2
0
1
00 E
E
=EEE=E  . For 
example, if we wish to maximize the individual efficiency of the second stage 20E  while 
maintaining the overall efficiency at 0E  as calculated in model (9), the model will be the 
following: 
r0
s
=r
r yumax=E 
1
2
0          (10) 
1
1
=zws.t. d0
D
=d
d  , 0
1
0
1
=xvEyu i0
m
=i
ir0
s
=r
r   , 
   
 
  
15 
0
11
  ij
m
=i
irj
s
=r
r xvyu , 0
11
  ij
m
=i
idj
D
=d
d xvzw , 0
11
  dj
D
=d
drj
s
=r
r zwyu , 
n,,=j 1,2 , εw,v,u pir  , m,,=i 1,2 , s,,=r 1,2 , D,,=d 1,2  
and the other individual efficiency 10E  will be 2
0
01
0 E
E
=E . As noted by Cook et al. (2010) this 
decomposition is not available either on typical DEA or network DEA models, which will be 
discussed later. 
Chen et al. (2009b) prove that Chen and Zhu's (2004) model (2) transformed in CRS is 
equivalent with Kao and Hwang's (2008) model (10). The advantage of model (10) is the 
assessment of individual efficiencies for the two stages. In contrast, model (2) of Chen and 
Zhu (2004) fail to do so, because when transformed in CRS, α and β do not represent the 
efficiencies of each stage. On the other hand, the drawback of Kao and Hwang's (2008) model 
is that can be used only in CRS. Chen et al. (2009a) overcome this drawback by proposing the 
additive efficiency decomposition model, which allows the VRS assumption. 
According to Chen et al. (2009a) the overall efficiency is evaluated as follows: 
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And the maximization problem will be expressed as: 
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Problem (11) cannot be converted in linear form. In order to surpass this problem, Chen et al. 
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(2009a) try to find the best possible method to specify the exogenous weights 1ξ  and 2ξ , 
which represent the significance of each stage in the overall process. The authors state that a 
proper measure for the significance of each stage is their size, which can be proxied by the 
total inputs of each stage. Thus, the overall size is d0
D
=d
di0
m
=i
i zw+xv  
11
 which is the sum of 
the first stage size i0
m
=i
i xv 
1
 and the second stage size d0
D
=d
d zw 
1
. Therefore, the significance 
of each stage is calculated as: 
d0
D
=d
di0
m
=i
i
i0
m
=i
i
zw+xv
xv
=ξ




11
1
1  and 
d0
D
=d
di0
m
=i
i
d0
D
=d
d
zw+xv
zw
=ξ




11
1
2      (12) 
Next, the authors include the exogenous weights (12) in model (11). That is 
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D
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which can now be converted into a linear problem, as 
r0
s
=r
rd0
D
=d
d yu+zwmax  
11
        (14) 
1
11
=zw+xvs.t. d0
D
=d
di0
m
=i
i    
0
11
  ij
m
=i
idj
D
=d
d xvzw , 0
11
  dj
D
=d
drj
s
=r
r zwyu , 
n,,=j 1,2 , 0dir w,v,u  
The optimal overall efficiency for the process is evaluated by model (14). The individual 
   
 
  
17 
efficiencies are calculated by the authors in the same manner as in Kao and Hwang (2008) 
model (2). As already noted, the advantage of Chen et al. (2009a) model (14) over Kao and 
Hwang (2008) model (2) is that the first model can be applied under the VRS assumption. 
4. Network DEA 
Network-DEA is not a specific type of model but a group of models which share some 
common features. Färe and Grosskopf (1996a), based on Shephard (1970) and Shephard and 
Färe (1975), developed a series of models in order to deal with special cases that typical DEA 
fail to manage.  
4.1. Structure of Network DEA 
There are two types of structure in a Network DEA model, the serial and the parallel 
(Kao, 2009). 
4.1.1. Serial structure 
The two stage models that already have been presented in our paper are in the simple 
form of a serial network DEA model. Specifically, a serial network DEA model includes 
DMUs with two or more internal procedures which are linked with intermediate measures. In 
the simple form, a set of inputs is used by the first stage and a set of intermediate measures is 
produced, while the second stage uses the intermediate measures that stage 1 produce and 
generates a set of final outputs. In the simple form there are no exogenous inputs in stage 2 
and the entire intermediate measures are used by the second stage. Furthermore, final outputs 
are produced only by the second stage. A general form of a serial network DEA model is 
presented in figure 4 (Kao and Hwang, 2008). 
The differences between the simple and the general form lie on the number of internal 
procedures (in the general form there are more than two stages), inputs may enter in any 
stage, final outputs may be produced in any stage and intermediate measures may not be 
consumed entirely. 
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Figure 4: Serial Network DEA (Kao and Hwang, 2010). 
 
 
4.1.2. Parallel structure 
In this type of network DEA models the individual stages operate parallel and 
separately to each other. An extension of this type of model is the shared flows systems where 
the inputs are shared among the individual stages (Kao and Hwang, 2010). According to Kao 
and Hwang (2010) university is a perfect paradigm to describe a parallel system, where the 
individual stages are the departments which operate parallel and separately inside the 
university. In addition, the authors point out that a parallel model is a special case of a serial 
model without intermediate measures. Parallel model is presented in figure 5. 
Figure 5: Parallel Network DEA (Kao and Hwang, 2010). 
 
 
4.2. Types of network DEA models 
The main types of network DEA models as described by Färe and Grosskopf (2000) 
and Färe et al. (2007) are static, dynamic and technology adoption models. 
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4.2.1. Static model 
Static models are applied when the individual stages are linked with intermediate 
measures. Two stage DEA models are special cases of static models. In the general form there 
may exist multiple stages which are linked with intermediate measures. In addition, 
exogenous inputs and final outputs may exist in any stage. Färe and Whittaker (1995) apply 
static model at rural production, Lewis and Sexton (2004) evaluate the efficiency of the 
American baseball teams and Prieto and Zofio (2007) assess the efficiency of OECD 
countries. Färe and Whittaker (1995) investigate a two stage model, where “1” stands for 
stage 1 and “2” stands for stage 2, “0” is the stage where exogenous inputs enter the system 
and “3” is the stage where final outputs are produced. 
The vector of inputs is denoted as Xic0  where “ic” is the individual stage which 
consumes the input and 0 represent the stage where the input enters the system. For example, 
X
2
0  is the vector of inputs for stage 2. Also, overall inputs must be equal or greater than the 
sum of inputs of individual stages, XX +X 20
1
0 . The vector of outputs is denoted as Y
ic
ip  
where “ip” is the individual stage which produces the output and “ic” is the individual stage 
which uses the output. For example, Y21  is produced in stage 1 and consumed in stage 2. 
Furthermore, this output is the only intermediate measure in figure 6 and can be denoted as 
Z
2
1 . Also, overall outputs must be equal with the sum of outputs of individual stages. 
1s  is the 
number of outputs that comes from stage 1 and 2s  is the number of outputs that comes from 
stage 2. 
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Figure 6: Static Network DEA. 
 
The above network model for n,,=j 1,2  DMUs can be written as a linear 
problem. That is 
 YY,=Y 3231            (15) 
23
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1
1, s,=r,λs.t. ryrjy
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j  , 
,1,20
2
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j   
D,=d,zzλ ddj
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    131213121
1
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m,=i,μ ixijx
n
=j
j  1,1010
1
, 
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1
=μμ
n
=j
jj   
m,=i,x+ iixix  1,
2
0
1
0  
where jλ  and jμ  are the weights of DMUs for stages 2 and 1 respectively. From constraints 
1
1
=λ
n
=j
j  and 1,
1
=μ
n
=j
j  it is clear that the model adopts the VRS assumption. Constraints 
   
 
  
21 
ixijx
n
=j
jλ
2
0
2
0
1
  and ddj
n
=j
j zzλ
2
1
2
1
1
  are the input constraints for stage 2 and constraint 
ixijx
n
=j
jμ
1
0
1
0
1
  is the input constraint for stage 1. Constraints ryrjy
n
=j
jλ
3
2
3
2
1
  and 
   rydrjydj
n
=j
j +z+zμ
3
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
1
  are the output constraints where the second constraint includes 
the intermediate measures. Last, constraint iixix x+ 
2
0
1
0  ensures that the sum of inputs of 
each stage will not exceed the total available inputs. 
An interesting case of the above model is the simple case of the two stages as 
presented in figure 1. According to Färe and Grosskopf (1996b) the simple case of the two 
stage network DEA is the following: 
Enim
z,μ, jjλE,
~            (16) 
 1stages.t.  
m,=i,xExλ i0ij
n
=j
j  1,
1
, 
D,=d,zzλ d0dj
n
=j
j  1,~
1
, 
n,=j,λ j  1,0  
 2stage  
D,=d,zzμ d0dj
n
=j
j  1,~
1
, 
s,=r,yyμ r0rj
n
=j
j  1,
1
, 
n,=j,μ j  1,0  
where d0z
~  are set as unknown decision variables. Model (16) can be written as 
follows: 
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Enim
z,μ, jjλE,
~           (17) 
m,=i,xExλs.t. i0ij
n
=j
j  1,
1
, 
  D,=d,zμλ dj
n
=j
jj  1,0
1
, 
s,=r,yyμ r0rj
n
=j
j  1,
1
, 
n,=j,μ,λ jj  1,0  
According to Cook et al. (2010) model (16) is equivalent to model (2) of Chen and 
Zhu (2004) and model (17) is equivalent to model (9) of Kao and Hwang (2008) and the 
cooperative model which will be discussed later. As we have already mentioned, typical DEA 
models cannot evaluate the efficiency of individual stages in a coordinated manner while Kao 
and Hwang's (2008) two stage model address this problem. Kao (2009) develop a relational 
model which assesses the efficiency of more general systems with more than two stages. 
Hsieh and Lin (2010) apply Kao's (2009) model at tourist hotels in Taiwan while Kao and 
Hwang (2010) investigate the impact of information technology on a firm's efficiency. 
Another special case is a system with two stages which are linked with intermediate 
measures but final outputs are generated from both stages. Färe et al. (2004) use this model to 
study property rights. In their model there are two stages and each stage represents a firm. 
Firm 1 generates two outputs, a good one and a bad one. The good output is a final output 
while the bad output is an intermediate output which is used as an input by firm 2. Then, firm 
2 converts the bad output into a good final output. This model is presented in figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Static Network DEA with first stage final outputs and bad intermediate outputs (Färe et al., 2004). 
 
The static network DEA model can be used to evaluate the efficiency of a supply chain by 
incorporating game theory aspects. This alternative method will be presented later. 
4.2.2. Dynamic model 
In dynamic model the outputs of the procedure in a specific time period are used as 
inputs in the next period and can be treated as intermediate measures in time. Dynamic model 
is widely applied in the literature. Färe and Grosskopf (1997) investigate countries' 
inefficiency which occurs from misallocation of resources in time. Nemota and Gota (1999) 
study the dynamic inefficiency based on Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Jaenicke (2000) 
apply a dynamic model in rural production while Nemota and Gota (2003) use it in the case of 
electricity production. Chen (2009) proposes a unified framework for efficiency assessment in 
a dynamic production network system. 
In figure 8 (Färe and Grosskopf, 2000) a DMU is presented with two stages, tP  and 
1+tP  which take place in time t and t+1 respectively. Stage tP  produces try  ts,=r 1,  as a 
final output and tdz  tD,=d 1,  as an intermediate output in time. Inputs tix  tm,=i 1,  
and 1+tix  11, +tm,=i   are exogenously entering the system. The terms 1tdz  11,  tD,=d  
and 1+tdz  11, +tD,=d   are used to generalize the system with more stages. If we are 
interested only in periods t and t+1, we exclude these terms. It is obvious that dynamic and 
static models are both consisted by multiple stages linked with intermediate measures, but in a 
dynamic model the individual stages function in a different time period. 
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Figure 8: Dynamic Network DEA (Färe and Grosskopf, 2000). 
 
 
4.2.3. Shared flow or technology adoption model 
This model is used in order to allocate the resources properly among the different 
stages of production technologies. Färe et al. (1997) apply this model to study the allocation 
of rural land. Lothgren and Tambour (1999) investigate the allocation of labor time among 
production and customer service while Färe et al. (2007) examine the use of technology 
adoption model to allocate pollution permits. 
The simple case of technology adoption model is presented in figure 9 (Färe et al., 
2007). Inputs ix  are allocated among two production technologies. 
1
ix  are the inputs of the 
first production technology and 2ix  are the inputs of the second production technology. The 
sum of individual inputs must not exceed the overall inputs ix , 
21
iii x+xx  . Then, the two 
production technologies produce the final outputs 1ry  and 
2
ry  respectively. 
 
Figure 9: Shared flow model (Färe et al., 2007) 
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As we have previously presented, Chen and Zhu (2004) study the impact of 
information technology on the efficiency of firms. Chen et al. (2006) argue that the 
disadvantage of Chen and Zhu (2004) model is that information technology in their model has 
an impact only in the first stage, ignoring the possible impact in the second stage. Chen et al. 
(2006) address this problem by proposing a technology adoption model where the impact of 
information technology is decomposed and allocated among all stages. 
5. Game theory models 
We have presented in previous section the models of Zhu (2003) and Chen and Zhu 
(2004) which evaluate the efficiency of a supply chain, considering the overall and individual 
efficiencies of each stage simultaneously. A typical supply chain is presented in figure 3 (Zhu, 
2003) which is consisted by a supplier, a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer. 
Liang et al. (2006) investigate the supply chain as a seller-buyer game under non-
cooperative and cooperative assumptions. A common type of non-cooperative game is the 
leader-follower model, also known as Stackelberg model. A simpler supply chain consisting 
by only two members, a manufacturer and a retailer, is presented in figure 10. The 
manufacturer is considered the leader and the retailer is the follower. In this type of model, the 
efficiency of the leader (manufacturer) is evaluated first by applying a typical DEA model and 
then the efficiency of the follower (retailer) is calculated subject to the leader's efficiency. The 
game considers the maximization of leader's efficiency as more significant for the overall 
supply chain compared to the follower's efficiency (Liang et al., 2008). 
Under the cooperative assumption, both stages are considered as equally important for 
the overall supply chain. Both parties cooperate with each other and wish to jointly maximize 
the overall and their individual efficiencies. The key point of the cooperation is found at the 
intermediate measures. The individual efficiencies are evaluated simultaneously and the 
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overall efficiency is equal with the mean efficiency of the individual stages. 
The simple form of the supply chain is presented in figure 10 (Zhu, 2009), where stage 
1 is the manufacturer and stage 2 is the retailer. The model consists of n,=j 1,  DMUs. The 
manufacturer consumes ix  m,=i 1,  inputs and generates dz  D,=d 1,  intermediate 
outputs. The retailer uses dz  D,=d 1,  intermediate inputs from the manufacturer and 
px  P,=p 1,  exogenous inputs and produces ry  s,=r 1,  final outputs. 
 
Figure 10: A simple supply chain with exogenous inputs in second stage (Zhu, 2009). 
 
5.1. Non-cooperative game 
Let’s assume a seller-buyer game, where the manufacturer is the seller and the retailer 
is the buyer. Also, the manufacturer is considered the leader while the retailer is the follower. 
Then, according to Liang et al. (2006) we evaluate the leader's efficiency by applying a 
typical DEA model formulated as 




m
=i
i0i
D
=d
d0d
xv
zw
=Emax
1
1
1           (18) 
1
1
1 
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m
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D
=d
djd
xv
zw
s.t.  , n,,=j 1,2 , 
m,=iD,=dv,w id  1,,1,0,  
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which can be easily transformed into a typical CRS DEA model as 
d0
D
=d
d zμ=Emax 
1
1          (19) 
0
11
  dj
D
=d
dij
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i zμxωs.t. , n,,=j 1,2 , 
1
1
=xω i0
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=i
i  , 
m,=iD,=dω,μ id  1,,1,0,  
Model (19) assesses the manufacturer's maximized efficiency *1E  and the optimal 
weights *dμ  and 
*
iω . Subject to these optimal values Liang et al. (2006) evaluate the 
follower's efficiency as 
p0
P
=p
pd0
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which can be transformed into the following non-linear problem: 
r0
s
=r
r yγ=Emax 
1
2          (21) 
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0
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where the first two constraints refer to the retailer while next three constraints refer to the 
manufacturer and ensure his optimal efficiency. 
Model (21) is non-linear because of the “q” term. As we can see from the constraints 
of model (21): 
1
11
=xω+zμq p0
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pd0
D
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The constraint 1
11
=xω+zμq p0
P
=p
pd0
D
=d
d    shows that p0
P
=p
p xω 
1
 can take values from 0 to 
1 because both terms, pω  and p0x , are non-negative quantities. If p0
P
=p
p xω 
1
 takes the value 
0, the numerator in (22) will become 1 and the overall fraction will become 0, otherwise if 
p0
P
=p
p xω 
1
 takes the value 1, the numerator in (22) will become 0 and the overall fraction will 
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become 
*
1
1
E
. Therefore, we can determine an upper and a lower bound for q term, 
*
1
1
0
E
<q . Thus, we can treat q as a parameter and model (21) can be solved as a parametric 
linear program. 
According to Liang et al. (2006) in order to solve the problem, we set an initial value 
to q term, 
*
1
0
1
E
=q  and solve the resulting linear problem. Then, we decrease the q term each 
time by a small number ε until we reach the lower bound and we name the resulting values of 
q as tq . We solve each resulting linear problem for every tq  and we name the solutions as 
 tqΕ*2 . The optimal solution is  tqΕmax=Ε *2*2  which is the retailer's efficiency and the 
optimal q associated with this solution is *q . 
With the individual efficiencies evaluated, we can calculate the overall efficiency of 
the supply chain as  *2*12
1
Ε+E=Ε  (Liang et al., 2006). Similarly, model (21) can assess the 
efficiency of the overall supply chain by considering the retailer as the leader, in the same 
manner. 
5.2. Cooperative game 
In the cooperative model we try to find the optimal weights for intermediate measures 
that maximize the leader's efficiency. In the cooperative model the seller and the buyer have 
the same bargaining power and cooperate to jointly maximize their efficiency. Therefore, they 
now treat the intermediate measures in a coordinated manner by setting their optimal weights 
as equal treating them either as outputs at the seller's stage or as inputs at the buyer's stage. 
The cooperative game of Liang et al. (2006) is the following: 
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Next, the authors apply the Charnes-Cooper transformation in order to convert model 
(23) into a linear problem. That is 
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Obviously, there is a linear relation between 1dμ  and 
2
dμ , 
12
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positive number. Therefore, we can convert model (23) into the following model: 
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1=xω i0i  , 
1
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21  
where the first and the third constraints refer to the manufacturer while the second and the 
fourth refer to the retailer. Model (25) is non-linear because in the second constraint there is 
the term 2dμ  which includes a summation at the denominator as we can see in (24). However, 
we can replace this term by using the relation 12 dd μk=μ  . Thus: 






  r0
s
=r
rd0
D
=d
d yγ+zμ=Emax
11
1
2
1
       (26) 
0
1
1
1
  dj
D
=d
dij
m
=i
i zμxωs.t. , n,,=j 1,2 , 
0
11
1
1
  rj
s
=r
rpj
P
=p
pdjd
D
=d
yγxω+zμk , n,,=j 1,2 , 
1=xω i0i  , 
1
1
1
1
=xω+zμk p0
P
=p
pd0d
D
=d
  , 
s,=rP,=pD,=dm,=ik,γ,μ,ω,ω rdpi  1.,1,,1,,1,0,
1  
The term 1dμ  does not include a summation at the denominator and as a result 
1
dμ  does 
not create a non-linearity problem. Now, only the k term creates the non-linearity problem. As 
we can see from the constraints of model (26): 
1
1
1
1
=xω+zμk p0
P
=p
pd0d
D
=d
   and *1
1
1 E=zμ d0
D
=d
d   
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Thus: 
*
1
1
1
1
1
11
E
xω
=q
zμ
xω
=k
p0
P
=p
p
dj
D
=d
d
p0
P
=p
p 














 


      (27) 
The constraint 1
1
1
1
=xω+zμk p0
P
=p
pd0d
D
=d
   shows that p0
P
=p
p xω 
1
 can take values from 0 to 
1 because both terms, pω  and p0x , are non-negative quantities. If p0
P
=p
p xω 
1
 takes the value 
0, the numerator in (27) will become 1 and the overall fraction will become 0, otherwise if 
p0
P
=p
p xω 
1
 takes the value 1, the numerator in (27) will become 0 and the overall fraction will 
become 
*
1
1
E
. Therefore, we can determine an upper and a lower bound for k term, 
*
1
1
0
E
<k . Thus, we can treat k as a parameter and model (26) can be solved as a parametric 
linear program, using the same method as in model (21). 
Liang et al. (2006) propose the above model in order to assess the overall and the 
individual efficiencies simultaneously. The individual efficiencies are calculated as 
d0d zμ=Ε 
1*
1  and r0r yγ=Ε 
*
2 . The authors note that the cooperative efficiencies are at least 
equal with the non-cooperative efficiencies. The cooperative model of Liang et al. (2006) 
evaluates the efficiency of a simple supply chain which consists of two parties. Zhu and Cook 
(2007) extend the model of Liang et al. (2006) in order to include three or more parties. 
5.2.1. Discussion of cooperative and non-cooperative models 
The models of Liang et al. (2006) include exogenous inputs in the second stage. These 
exogenous inputs create non-linearity which dealt with parametric linear programming. Liang 
et al. (2008) investigate similar models without exogenous inputs in the second stage. The 
only inputs in the second stage are the intermediate measures produced in first stage. In Liang 
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et al. (2008) models, the overall efficiency is calculated as the product of individual 
efficiencies, 21 ΕΕ=Ε   instead of  212
1
ΕΕ=Ε  . Exogenous inputs in the second stage do 
not allow this calculation in Liang et al.'s (2006) models because the transformation into a 
linear or parametric linear program will not be possible. 
Models of Liang et al. (2006) and Liang et al. (2008) have a comparative advantage 
over other models, like Chen and Zhu (2004), Seiford and Zhu (1999) and network DEA 
because they assess both overall and individual efficiencies of the supply chain. As we have 
already noted, this is also true for the model of Kao and Hwang (2008) which according to 
Cook et al. (2010) is equivalent to the cooperative model. 
Furthermore, Liang et al. (2008) prove that when there is only one intermediate 
measure in their models, the resulting efficiencies from cooperative and non-cooperative 
models are exactly the same. Also, the decomposition of the overall efficiency into individuals 
is unique. Additionally, individual efficiencies are the same as if we apply a typical DEA 
model at each stage separately. On the other hand, if there are multiple intermediate measures, 
then the non-cooperative model yields unique efficiency decomposition while efficiency 
decomposition for the cooperative model is not unique. 
5.3. Nash bargaining game 
Du et al. (2010) apply another form of cooperative model in two stage DEA, the Nash 
bargaining game. They adopt a similar supply chain with Liang et al. (2008), with no 
exogenous inputs in the second stage and all the first stage outputs are intermediate measures 
and consumed entirely by the second stage. Additionally, following the previous cooperation 
models of Liang et al. (2006, 2008) and Kao and Hwang (2008) they treat the intermediate 
measures in a coordinated manner by setting their optimal weights as equal treating them  
either as outputs in the first stage or as inputs in the second stage. 
Du et al. (2010) consider the two stages as two players in a Nash bargaining game who 
   
 
 
34 
bargain for a better payoff. Three main aspects must be defined in a Nash bargaining game, a) 
the participating players, say a manufacturer and a retailer, 2}{1,=Ν , b) a feasible set of 
payoffs, which is the set of DEA efficiencies and c) a breakdown point, which is the payoff if 
the participating players do not reach an agreement. The authors define as a breakdown point 
the efficiencies of the worst possible DMU, that is the DMU with maximum inputs and 
minimum outputs, thus di zmin,xmax  in the first stage and rd ymin,zmax  in the second 
stage. These are the worst possible efficiencies and are denoted as minθ1  and 
minθ2  for the two 
stages respectively. These efficiencies are set as the breakdown point. In addition, the weights 
in the two stage model are considered as the possible strategies for the participating players. 
Nash point out that for the bargaining game there is a unique solution which can be found by 
applying the following maximization problem. 
  
2
1=i
ii
max
buS,u
bu           (28) 
where u

is the payoff vector for the two participating players, S is the feasible set of payoffs 
and b is the breakdown point. 
After defining the above, the model of Du et al. (2010) will be the following: 




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

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
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
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
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
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r
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d0
D
=d
d
θ
zw
yu
θ
xv
zw
max 2
1
1
1
1
1      (29) 
min
i0
m
=i
i
d0
D
=d
d
θ
xv
zw
s.t. 1
1
1 




, min
d0
D
=d
d
r0
s
=r
r
θ
zw
yu
2
1
1 




, 
1
1
1 



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ij
m
=i
i
dj
D
=d
d
xv
zw
, n,,=j 1,2 , 
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1
1
1 




dj
D
=d
d
rj
s
=r
r
zw
yu
, n,,=j 1,2 , 
s,=rD,=dm,=i>u,w,v rdi  1,,1,,1,0,  
where the objective function is the bargaining problem (28). The first two constraints ensure 
that individual efficiencies will not be less than the worst possible efficiencies minθ1  and 
minθ2 . 
The next two constraints are the typical constraints of a fractional DEA program. 
Then, the authors apply the transformation (24) at model (29) in order to convert it 
into a linear program. That is 
i0
m
=i
i xv
=t

1
1
1
, 
d0
D
=d
d zw
=t

1
2
1
,       (30) 
 ii vt=ω 1 , dd wt=μ 1 , rr ut=γ 1
1 , rr ut=γ 2
2 , 
s,=rm,=iD,=d  1,,1,,1,  
Obviously, there is a linear relation between 1rγ  and 
2
rγ , 
21
rr γα=γ   where 
2
1
t
t
=α   is a 
positive number. Therefore, we can convert model (29) into the following model: 
minmin
d0
D
=d
d
min
r0
s
=r
r
min
r0
s
=r
r θθ+zμθyγθyγmax 21
1
2
1
2
1
1
1       (31) 
min
d0
D
=d
d θzμs.t. 1
1
 , minr0
s
=r
r θyγ 2
1
2  , 
1
1
=xω i0
m
=i
i  , α=zμ d0
D
=d
d 
1
, 
0
11
  ij
m
=i
idj
D
=d
d xωzμ , n,,=j 1,2 , 
0
11
1   dj
D
=d
drj
s
=r
r zμyγ , n,,=j 1,2 , 
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21
rr γα=γ  , s,,=r 1,2 , 
s,=rD,=dm,=i>α,γ,γ,μ,ω rrdi  1,,1,,1,,0
21  
Model (31) can be transformed into the following model by applying the relation 
21
rr γα=γ  . That is 
minmin
d0
D
=d
d
min
r0
s
=r
r
min
r0
s
=r
r θθ+zμθyγθyγαmax 21
1
2
1
2
1
1
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2  
Model (32) is non-linear because of the “α” term. As we can see from the constraints of model 
(32): 
ij
m
=i
idj
D
=d
dij
m
=i
idj
D
=d
d xωzμxωzμ  
1111
0 , n,,=j 1,2 , 
1
1
=xω i0
m
=i
i   , α=zμ d0
D
=d
d 
1
 and mind0
D
=d
d θzμ 1
1
 . 
If we combine constraints α=zμ d0
D
=d
d 
1
 and mind0
D
=d
d θzμ 1
1
  then: 
minmin
d0
D
=d
d θαθzμ 11
1
 . Therefore, we replace constraint 1
1
=xω i0
m
=i
i   and minθα 1  back 
to the first constraint: 11
11
  αθxωzμ minij
m
=i
idj
D
=d
d .      
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Therefore, we can determine an upper and a lower bound for α term. Thus, we can 
treat α as a parameter and model (32) can be solved as a parametric linear program, using the 
same method as in model (21). Thus, according to Du et al. (2010) the efficiencies of the 
model are **1 α=Ε  from the constraint α=zμ d0
D
=d
d 
1
, r0r yγ=Ε 
2*
2  and the efficiency of the 
entire supply chain can be calculated as *2
*
1
* ΕΕ=Ε  . 
The authors point out that if there is only one intermediate measure in the supply chain 
then the individual efficiencies are the same as if we apply a typical DEA model at each stage 
separately. As a result, in this case the efficiencies of the model are equal with the efficiencies 
of the cooperative model of Liang et al. (2008). In addition, the model of Liang et al. (2008) is 
a special case of model (32) with zero breakdown point. Finally, the efficiencies of Liang et 
al.'s (2008) model are the best feasible efficiencies for model (32) as it is not possible to 
achieve further improvement. 
6. Conclusion and future perspectives 
In this paper we provide a thorough survey and a detailed classification of supply 
chain DEA models with internal structures. We concentrate on two-stage models with 
intermediate measures between the first and the second stage and some variations such as 
models with exogenous inputs in the second stage. We also extend our survey in some special 
cases where there are more than two stages or there are no intermediate measures. 
We classify the models into four categories: 1) Models which apply standard DEA 
approach in each stage separately. Models in this category do not consider the possible 
conflicts between the two stages. 2) Relational DEA models which treat intermediate 
measures in a coordinated manner. 3) Network DEA models which may include more than 
two stages, may not have intermediate measures, may have dynamic structures and may share 
the inputs among the stages. 4) Game theoretic models which are divided in non-cooperative 
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and cooperative models. Also, cooperative models include the Nash bargaining game model. 
As it is clear along our survey, a model must treat the intermediate measures in a 
coordinated manner in order to incorporate the interrelated decisions among the stages. A 
reliable model can assist the decision maker in order to achieve strategic alignment among the 
different members of the supply chain (O’Leary-Kelly and Flores, 2002). Furthermore, a 
comprehensive and accurate model would assist the decision maker to monitor and control the 
entire supply chain and its individual components more effectively. 
The models we present in this paper can be applied in various firms and organizations 
with simple or complex internal structures. Verma and Sinha (2002) and Swink et al. (2006) 
point out that a high technology firm develops multiple new products. The firm has specific 
resources which must be allocated among the developing products. A shared flow model as 
presented above may be the proper model to study the resource interdependence among the 
different products. Ross and Droge (2002, 2004) examine the distribution centers of a 
petroleum industry. The authors group the distribution centers into three categories. If we 
want to extend this model and examine the efficiency of n,,=j 1,2  petroleum industries, 
we could see the three groups as three individual stages and apply a supply chain DEA model 
which will capture the interrelations among the distribution centers. 
Several studies can be extended in two or more stages structure with the proper 
modification. Sarkis (2000) examines the efficiency of the airports, Sun (2004) investigates 
the efficiency of braches of Taiwanese army and Narasimah et al. (2005) apply DEA in a 
government agency. All the above are complex entities and supply chain DEA models may be 
the appropriate tool in order to capture the possible conflicts and interrelations among the 
stages and evaluate the overall efficiency properly. In addition, other aspects inside a firm 
could be properly studied with a supply chain model, like the impact of information 
technology on the efficiency of the firm. Hendricks et al. (2007) and Bendoly et al. (2009) 
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study the use of information technology inside a firm. Chen and Zhu (2004) and Chen et al. 
(2006) show how this impact can be approached by supply chain models. Specifically, Chen 
et al. (2006) extend his model to decompose and allocate the information technology in every 
stage. 
In conclusion, standard DEA approach is a valuable tool for efficiency evaluation 
however when there are more complex systems than a simple input-output procedure fails, to 
address the internal structures. A decision maker needs a tool which can incorporate these 
interrelations into the model and provide more accurate results in order to monitor the overall 
and individual procedures more effectively and make better decisions. In this paper we 
provide all the available models for a simple two-stage procedure and some extensions into 
more complex structures. 
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